Dynamics and Diversity in Epistemic Communities by O'Connor, Cailin & Bruner, Justin
Dynamics and Diversity in Epistemic Communities
Cailin O’Connor and Justin Bruner
This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in
Erkenntnis. The final authenticated version is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-
017-9950-y
Abstract
Bruner (2017) shows that in cultural interactions, members of minority groups
will learn to interact with members of majority groups more quickly—minorities tend
to meet majorities more often as a brute fact of their respective numbers—and, as
a result, may come to be disadvantaged in situations where they divide resources.
In this paper, we discuss the implications of this effect for epistemic communities.
We use evolutionary game theoretic methods to show that minority groups can end
up disadvantaged in academic interactions like bargaining and collaboration as a
result of this effect. These outcomes are more likely, in our models, the smaller the
minority group. They occur despite assumptions that majority and minority groups
do not differ with respect to skill level, personality, preference, or competence of
any sort. Furthermore, as we will argue, these disadvantaged outcomes for minority
groups may negatively impact the progress of epistemic communities.
1 Introduction
Bruner (2017) shows that in cultural interactions, members of minority groups learn to
interact with members of majority groups more quickly—minorities tend to meet ma-
jorities much more often as a brute fact of their respective numbers—and, as a result,
may come to be disadvantaged in situations where they divide resources. In this paper,
we discuss the implications of this effect for epistemic communities.1 In particular we
ask: when authors develop norms for bargaining and collaboration, can this effect dis-
advantage minority groups? What about groups in an epistemic minority—those who
take minority views, or use less popular methodologies?
We use evolutionary game theoretic methods to show that minority groups can end
up disadvantaged in academic interactions as a result of this effect. These outcomes
are more likely, in our models, the smaller the minority group. They occur despite as-
sumptions that majority and minority groups do not differ with respect to skill level,
personality, preference, or competence of any sort. Furthermore, as we will argue, these
1By epistemic communities we mean groups of knowledge makers like academics and industry re-
searchers, though our discussion will generally focus on academia.
1
disadvantaged outcomes for minority groups may help explain why some groups, includ-
ing women and racial minorities, tend to cluster into subdisciplines in academia. As we
will point out these effects may impact epistemic progress both by decreasing gender
and racial diversity in epistemic communities and so potentially decreasing the epis-
temic diversity of these communities, and also by directly impacting those in epistemic
minorities.
One of the most striking things about the effects we describe is that this minority
disadvantage occurs even in models of populations where actors do not display the usual
psychological effects associated with minority disadvantage in epistemic communities.
They do not experience stereotype threat. They do not have implicit biases. There is
no question that these psychological phenomena are an important part of explaining
the failure of some academic fields to diversify (Saul, 2011). But our results imply that
simply tackling these particular psychological effects may not be enough to eradicate
inequitable norms in epistemic groups.
Our paper will proceed as follows. In section 2, we justify the use of evolutionary
game theory to model epistemic communities, and describe this methodology. In section
3, we outline the games we use to represent collaboration and bargaining in academia. In
section 4, we describe our results as well as relevant work from other authors. In section
5 we discuss the relevance of these results to epistemic progress. In the conclusion, we
assess the epistemic role these models can play, and briefly describe policy measures that
may help prevent the social dynamical effects we describe.
2 Methodology
Evolutionary game theory is a methodology used by social scientists and philosophers to
inform how strategic behavior in humans changes through learning and social learning.
Since our aim is to investigate how communities of epistemic agents learn to interact
strategically with each other, evolutionary game theory is an appropriate methodology
to employ. Before continuing, it will be useful to briefly describe evolutionary game
theoretic methods.2 A game in game theory is a model of a strategic interaction between
agents. Games are usually defined by a set of players, or actors in the game, a set of
strategies—available actions—for each player, and payoffs for each possible combination
of strategies.3
Traditionally, game theorists have focused on rational decision making by actors, as
defined by payoff maximization where payoff tracks actors’ preferences. The evolutionary
game theoretic approach, in contrast, attempts to understand behavior by appeal to
evolution, cultural evolution, or learning. This is done by applying what are called
dynamics to games—rules that determine how populations of actors playing a game
will change based on past interactions. Throughout this paper, we will employ the
2Readers who wish to engage more thoroughly with the details of our results, but who are not familiar
with the methods used, may wish to read Weibull (1997) or Gintis (2009).
3Traditional games also define information available to the actors, but in evolutionary game theory,
this aspect is downplayed.
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replicator dynamics to model behavioral change in epistemic communities.4 The basic
idea behind the replicator dynamics is that in a population with many actors playing
different strategies, the strategies that get higher payoffs will proliferate, while those
with lower payoffs will decline in number. In the case of an epistemic community, it is
natural to think of payoffs as corresponding to the amount of esteem or credit a particular
researcher receives.5 Individuals in an epistemic community are then assumed to imitate
and repeat successful actions that gained credit in the past, leading to the proliferation
of such successful actions.
One further concept we must mention before continuing is that of a Nash equilibrium.
A Nash equilibrium for a game is a set of strategies where no player may deviate and
improve her payoff. These strategy sets tend to be stable and to arise in real world
settings for this reason. They also arise in many evolutionary settings, making them
relevant to our evolutionary analysis.
3 Epistemic Games and Type-Conditional Behavior
As just discussed, evolutionary game theoretic models include two things—games and
dynamics. In this section we describe the games we use to model strategic interactions
in epistemic communities. In the next section we add the dynamics and discuss results.
There are two sorts of strategic interaction that we focus on here—bargaining and
collaboration. We start with bargaining. In the Nash demand game, actors each demand
a certain portion of a resource. If the demands of the actors do not exceed the resource,
each receives the portion they requested. If, on the other hand, the demands are greater
than the total resource, bargaining fails and the two actors receive what is called the
‘disagreement point’ (often nothing). Figure 1 displays a payoff table of a simplified
version of this game where actors can demand 4, 5, or 6 of a total resource of 10. We call
these demands ‘Low’, ‘Med’, and ‘High’.6 A payoff table lists payoffs to actors for any
combination of possible strategies in a game. This game has three (pure strategy) Nash
equilibria—High v Low, Med v Med, and Low v High.7 In each of these the actors fully
divide the resource. This means that if either actor demands more, the disagreement
point is reached. If either demands less, she simply gets less.
We will use this game to model certain interactions between epistemic agents. Bar-
gaining may not seem like a central part of research because there are only a few
4These dynamics were intended as a model of change via natural selection, but have subsequently
been shown to effectively model both individual learning (Bo¨rgers and Sarin, 1997; Hopkins, 2002) and
cultural evolution (Weibull, 1997).
5Kitcher (1990) and Strevens (2003) appeal to the ‘credit economy’ to model academics in a classical
game-theoretic framework, while Bruner (2013) uses similar assumptions in a dynamic model involving
cultural evolution.
6Simplified games of this sort are standardly employed in evolutionary analyses of bargaining (Young,
1993; Skyrms, 1996; Alexander and Skyrms, 1999; Binmore, 2008).
7Pure strategies are ones where actors always take the same action rather than randomly mixing over
multiple actions. This game (and the following one) also have mixed Nash equilibria—those where actors
use strategies that probabilistically choose actions—but these will be less germane to our evolutionary
analyses and so we do not discuss them here.
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Figure 1: A payoff table for a Nash demand game. Rows represent strategy choices for
player 1. Columns represent strategy choices for player 2. Entries list the payoff for
player 1 followed by that for player 2.
situations—salary and funding negotiations, for example—in which researchers explic-
itly bargain over resources. In any sort of joint project, however—conference planning,
committee work, running a department, or collaborative research—by some process of
implicit or explicit negotiation, actors must decide who will take on what portion of
the work done. Although the Nash demand game is formulated as a situation where
two individuals divide a resource, it can just as easily be interpreted as two individuals
dividing tasks. As such, this game is an appropriate model both of explicit bargaining
over resources such as salary, and of bargaining over workload in joint projects.
The second game is a model of combined joint action and bargaining. We call it the
collaboration game. Two actors first decide whether to enter a collaborative partnership
(or joint project), or work alone. Should the two actors choose to work together they gain
greater joint payoff for mutual work, but must decide how to divide the resource obtained.
As is clear from figure 2, there are four strategies in this game—the uncollaborative Solo
strategy and three collaborative strategies where actors demand Low, Med, or High of
their partner. Solo always generates a dependable, low payoff. Collaboration leads to
a higher joint payoff, though it is now risky for two reasons: 1) a partner could choose
Solo or 2) bargaining could fail. Either of these outcomes leads to a payoff of zero. This
game has up to four Nash equilibria depending on the payoffs. Solo v Solo is always
an equilibrium (if your partner will not work with you, there is no point in trying).
If the Solo option does not yield too high a payoff, the three compatible bargaining
demands—Low v High, Med v Med, and High v Low—are equilibria as well.8
This model captures a strategic scenario that many collaborating or cooperating aca-
demics encounter. Academics typically must decide whether or not to collaborate with
a potential co-author. Collaboration is beneficial because it comes with the potential
for rewards.9 It is risky, however, because if a collaborative partner fails to fulfill her
part of the project properly, or engages in academic dishonesty, her co-authors may be
8This game is extensively analyzed by Wagner (2012) who calls it the stag hunt/divide the dollar
game to capture the sense that it combines joint action and bargaining. It is equivalent to a Nash
demand game with an outside option.
9Co-authored papers are more likely to be accepted to top journals in many fields, and are cited more
(Laband, 1987; Gordon, 1980; Beaver and Rosen, 1979; Card and DellaVigna, 2013). Many authors have
argued that collaboration improves overall academic productivity (Morrison et al., 2003; Landry et al.,
1996; Lee and Bozeman, 2005).
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Figure 2: A payoff table for a collaboration game. Rows represent strategy choices for
player 1. Columns represent strategy choices for player 2. Entries list the payoff for
player 1 followed by that for player 2.
disadvantaged.
Once collaboration begins, actors also must bargain either implicitly or explicitly
to decide how the efforts and rewards of collaboration will be divided. What will the
author order be? Who will do what portion of the work? These negotiations may end
at equitable divisions (Med v Med) as when, for example, one author puts in significant
effort and acts as first author. They may, however, end at inequitable divisions (Low v
High) as in cases where one actor does little work relative to author position.10
Typical game theoretic analyses consider interacting agents who behave the same
way upon meeting any other agent. In order to investigate the situation of minority
groups in epistemic communities, though, we need models where actors have the option
to treat each other differently based on aspects of social identity, like gender and race.11
(Later in the paper, we will also ask what happens when actors can condition behavior
on aspects of epistemic identity—like methodology used, or background assumptions
made.) In order to capture this, we investigate games where actors are of two different
types and condition their behavior on the type of their interactive partner. Importantly,
strategies for the type-conditional versions of the games described above are significantly
altered. Instead of strategies like ‘Solo’ or ‘High’, conditioning actors choose strategies
like ‘play Solo with my in-group, play High with my out-group’. We will use the notation
<Solo; High> to denote a joint strategy with the in-group strategy listed first and the
out-group second.
With these new strategies come new equilibria where actors play one Nash equilib-
rium against their in-group members and another against out-group members. Consider
10Recent work on ghost authorship implies that in some disciplines such outcomes are common (Ben-
nett and Taylor, 2003).
11This occurs in real academic communities. Tenure and promotion decisions are made differently
for women and men (Perna, 2001). Emails to professors asking for mentoring help tagged with male
and/or white sounding names receive more and better responses than those with female and/or ethnic
sounding names (Milkman et al., 2014). Black applicants are less likely to receive NIH funding than
white applicants controlling for other factors (Ginther et al., 2011). Researchers, when assessing otherwise
identical male and female academic job candidates, are more likely to believe males are more qualified,
more likely to hire the male, and more likely to offer him a higher salary (Moss-Racusin et al., 2012;
Steinpreis et al., 1999). Similar findings, some outside of academia, have been garnered for job candidates
who are LGBTQ or racial minorities (Tilcsik, 2011; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003).
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an academic community where women and men regularly bargain and where women
play the strategy <Med; Low> and men play <Med; High>. In this case, both men
and women make fair bargaining demands against like types, but when men and women
interact men demand greater resources and women concede. Despite the fact that, in
a case like this, women might prefer to receive better bargaining outcomes, because
men are all demanding High, women cannot switch strategies and improve their lot. Or
suppose that white researchers play <Med; Solo> and researchers of color play <Solo;
Solo>. In this case, white researchers collaborate amongst themselves, but not with re-
searchers of color, and researchers of color always work alone. Again, researchers of color
cannot make unilateral changes to reach a cooperative outcome with white researchers.
These examples of new equilibria in these games are significant for the current dis-
cussion because they can be interpreted as involving discriminatory norms (Axtell et al.,
2001; Bruner, 2017). At these equilibria, both populations treat out-group members
differently from in-group members and in both cases, as a result, one group is disadvan-
taged. Notably, two types of discriminatory norms can occur in the collaboration game.
Actors can refuse to cooperate with out-group members and disadvantage them in this
way, and they can also divide collaborative work and products differently with out and
in-group members. As we will show in the next section, these sorts of discriminatory
norms can emerge endogenously in populations of interacting epistemic agents.
4 Social Dynamics and Minority Disadvantage
We have now described the games we use to model strategic interaction in epistemic
communities. In this section we look at what happens when groups of researchers learn
to interact in these strategic scenarios. The dynamics employed here will be the replica-
tor dynamics which, as discussed in section 2, can be used to model social and individual
learning.12 The best way to interpret these dynamics is as an approximate representa-
tion of academics who copy the behaviors of successful colleagues, and repeat successful
behaviors of their own. Compelling research indicates that such social learning is ubiqui-
tous in humans and that, in particular, humans tend to imitate successful and prominent
peers (Richerson and Boyd, 2008; Henrich and Henrich, 2007).13 We start by describ-
ing previous result germane to this discussion. We then present new results on groups
12We use a version of the discrete time, two population replicator dynamics where one population may
be smaller than the other, and where all actors interact with both populations. Let x and y represent
the two populations so that x + y = 1 and x ≤ y. Strategies for population x update according to
x′i = xi(
fi(x,y)∑n
j=1 fj(x,y)xj)
) where xi is the proportion of the x population playing strategy i, fi(x, y) is
the fitness of type i in x given the population states of x and y, and
∑n
j=1 fj(x, y)xj is the average
population fitness for x given the states of x and y. Strategies for population y update according to the
analogous dynamics.
13Because we divide our populations into two types, where actors treat different types differently, we
also assume that they learn differently from the two types. Actors in our models imitate peers of their
own type, rather than the other. When it comes to choosing models for social learning humans have
indeed been found to be sensitive to social identity (Henrich and Henrich, 2007; Killian, 1990; Losin
et al., 2012).
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playing the collaboration game.
4.1 Previous Results
Imagine a group of researchers that includes two different types. This group of re-
searchers must bargain regularly, and, in doing so, learn to adopt bargaining practices
that work well for themselves and their peers, as just described. Axtell et al. (2001) find
that discriminatory norms commonly evolve in a Nash demand game model of such a
situation.14 Perhaps surprisingly, without types, the fair division, Med v Med, is seen
most often in such models (Skyrms, 1996; Ellingsen, 1997; Young, 1993). Without type-
conditioning, demanding High is risky because one is going to meet others with high
demands, and as a result sometimes reach the disagreement point. Those who demand
Low lose out on the resource when they meet others demanding Med or Low. In a type-
conditional model, though, if one demands High against a different type that always
demands Low, one is guaranteed to always receive High—the most preferable bargain-
ing outcome. The division into types allows for an advantageous (or disadvantageous)
strategy that is unavailable in a uniform population.15
Axtell et al. look only at situations with equally sized groups. When Bruner (2017)
looks at cases where one population is in a minority, he finds that the minority can be
at a significant disadvantage as far as bargaining outcomes go. For some Nash demand
games, the smaller the minority population, the more likely it is to end up at the un-
favorable bargaining outcome—where the minority demands Low against the majority
who demand High—and the less likely it is that the majority population ends up at this
outcome.
Why the disadvantage for minority groups? There is a difference, in these models, in
how strategically important each group is to the other. Majority members meet minority
types relatively rarely, whereas minority types are constantly interacting with majority
members. It is often the case that for the minority population, the least risky and
therefore best strategy is to demand Low of the majority. In simulations, the minority
group thus quickly learns to adapt to the majority by playing Low. Majority strategies
in response to the minority shift more slowly, and as a result the majority does best to
demand High against the minority population.16
It should be noted that this sort of effect does not always end in minority disadvantage—
in the right sort of game it will be advantageous on average for minority members to
quickly adapt to majorities by learning a strategy that benefits them (such as demand-
ing High in the Nash demand game). We do not focus on these situations since our
14They use dynamics where actors best respond to memory of past play. Bruner (2017) finds that for
the replicator dynamics such norms likewise arise. Skyrms and Zollman (2010) find similar results.
15D’Arms et al. (1998) similarly point out that allowing anti-correlated interaction between bargainers
who make high and low demands allows for the evolution of these two strategies.
16This effect is analogous to what is called the Red King effect in biology. When one of two mutu-
alistic biological species evolves more slowly than the other, under the right conditions they can gain
an advantage over their mutualistic partners (Bergstrom and Lachmann, 2003). For this reason, this
minority/majority effect has been described elsewhere as the cultural Red King effect (Bruner, 2017;
Rubin and O’Connor, 2017; O’Connor, 2017a,b).
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aim is to investigate cases where minority groups are potentially disadvantaged by social
dynamics in the absence of other factors. Furthermore, O’Connor (2017a,b) argues that
in the cultural case, minority disadvantage as a result of learning speed is much more
likely to occur.
4.2 New Results: Collaboration
We now consider how the effect described in the last section might disadvantage minori-
ties in epistemic communities where actors develop conventions around collaboration.
4.2.1 Minority Groups and Collaboration
Imagine a population of researchers of two types playing the collaboration game. We
begin by considering what happens when researchers learn to collaborate with those of
the other type. When the two types each make up 50% of the population, they are most
likely to reach fair bargaining outcomes. And when they reach unfair outcomes, they are
each equally likely to discriminate against the other. When one type is in the minority,
however, it is increasingly likely that the groups reach unfair bargaining outcomes when
they collaborate, and increasingly likely that the minority is disadvantaged in that they
demand Low against majority types who demand High. Figure 3 shows results for 10,000
runs of replicator dynamics simulations of this scenario. The payoff associated with Solo
was held fixed at 2.5. Low, Med, and High were set at 4, 5 and 6, respectively. The x-axis
shows the size of the minority population, and the y-axis shows which percentages of
runs that ended in collaboration reached each of the possible outcomes. As can be seen
in this figure, when the minority is very small, they end up disadvantaged in more than
half of these simulations. One thing that should be noted is that when a minority ends
up at a disadvantage with respect to a majority type this outcome can be particularly
damaging because minority members tend to interact with majority members more often
and so are most often receiving the Low payoff.
4.2.2 When Collaboration is Necessary
In the social sciences and humanities, collaborative work can provide benefits and so
may be desirable, but in most cases researchers in these areas can successfully perform
individual work as well. In the lab sciences, however, group work is often essential
to success. To expand our models to capture such situations, we vary the payoff of
individual work, or Solo (S). Note that when S = 0, the collaboration game is essentially
equivalent to the Nash demand game—individual work is completely useless so actors
must always collaborate and bargain. Slightly higher Ss represent cases where individual
work may not be as beneficial as collaborating, but can still provide some benefit.
We find that as S decreases, collaboration increases. This is unsurprising as the
payoff to individual work is poor when S is low. When S is low, however, it also becomes
increasingly likely that bargaining favors members of the majority group. Figure 4
illustrates these results. The minority constitutes 5% of the total population in this
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Figure 3: Simulations of populations playing the type-conditional collaboration game.
The x-axis represents different sizes of minority populations. The y-axis represents the
proportions of simulations that arrived at different outcomes.
figure, and the possible bargaining demands are 4, 5, and 6. As is evident, when S is
low the majority discriminates against the minority in over 60% of simulations and the
minority almost never discriminates against the majority.
These results occur because when S is low, minorities are unable to successfully opt
out of collaborating. In other words, they learn to collaborate even when discriminatory
norms governing collaboration arise. These results may indicate that minority groups
in areas where collaboration is necessary are at particularly high risk of disadvantage.
Note that as in the last results, when the minority group is disadvantaged here, it is
especially damaging because of the prominence of majority types.
4.2.3 Discrimination and Deterrence
We now explore cases in which norms of division have already become cemented in a
discipline. Agents still must choose whether to collaborate or not, but if collaboration
does occur, the individuals involved do not engage in bargaining, but fall back on extant
norms to determine how to divide labor and rewards. Our aim is now to determine
whether an existing unfair division will disincentivize collaboration by minority mem-
bers.17
17Note that in cases like this, because actors do not need to bargain, the collaboration game is essen-
tially equivalent to a stag hunt, but where the benefit for hunting stag is different for the two partners.
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Figure 4: Simulations of populations playing the type-conditional collaboration game.
The x-axis represents different values for S. The y-axis represents the proportions of
simulations that arrived at inter-group collaboration with different bargaining outcomes.
This further model is particularly important because it will not always be possible
for collaborative partners to determine their payoffs for collaboration. Collaborating
partners decide author order, but cannot control how an academic community reacts to
collaborative work. Consider, for example, a case where a hiring body assumes that the
white author on a joint paper must have contributed more to the collaboration than a
black partner, and gives credit accordingly. Sarsons et al. (2015) show that in the field of
economics this is commonplace in the case of gender, and may explain differential tenure
rates for men and women.18 The models here thus capture both scenarios where groups
bargain differently over collaboration due to existing social norms, and situations where
norms undervalue the contributions of underrepresented groups.
Figure 5 shows the proportion of instances in which collaboration emerges between
minority and majority groups in these models. We hold the payoff associated with
playing Solo fixed at 2, while Low is varied from 2.2 to 5. We find that unfair norms of
division disincentivize collaboration between types. The greater the inequity (the lower
Low), the less likely it is that collaboration emerges across groups. This effect is more
pronounced the smaller the minority population. When Low = 2.2 and the minority
group makes up 1% of the population, for example, collaboration only occurs between
types in about 10% of simulations. Again, this is particularly disastrous to the minority
18Amazingly, they find that when women co-author with each other, the effect is not as strong,
indicating that cross gender collaboration results in particularly little assigned credit for women.
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for by and large many of their interactions are with members of the majority, meaning
successful collaboration is relatively unlikely. Note that while it may seem like a good
thing for minority agents to avoid collaboration with majority agents if they receive
poorer outcomes, in these models there is still always an advantage to collaboration
(Solo is always less than Low).19 It also should be noted that when collaboration does
not emerge between groups the average payoff for the entire community drops because
solo work generates less credit than collaborative work. Although the minority group is
hurt more by this, the majority group is also hurt when they do not collaborate with
minority members.
Figure 5: Simulations of populations playing the type-conditional collaboration game
with existing norms of division. The x-axis represents different values for Low (the
payoff to minority types for collaboration). The y-axis represents the proportions of
simulations that arrived at inter-group collaboration.
These results again arise due to differential learning across populations. When actors
play the collaboration game with existing norms of division, Solo is a safe strategy as it
always guarantees a payoff. When minority types get relatively little for bargaining, they
are disincentivized from taking the risk of collaborating. This means that they quickly
learn to play Solo in these simulations, and the smaller the minority, the more quickly
this happens. Majority types then slowly learn to play Solo against them as well.
Some empirical observations are consistent with the results just presented. In many
fields, women are less likely to collaborate and more likely to collaborate with other
women (McDowell and Smith, 1992; Ferber and Teiman, 1980; West et al., 2013; Boschini
19These results are similar to some from Wagner (2012).
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and Sjo¨gren, 2007). McDowell and Smith (1992) have argued that the ‘productivity
gap’ between male and female economists could be explained by the fact that female
economists lose the benefits of collaborative endeavors. Del Carmen and Bing (2000)
find that African American authors in criminology are highly likely to work alone.
One phenomenon that may be partially explained by these outcomes is the clustering
of certain minority groups into academic subdisciplines. Botts et al. (2014), for example,
find that black philosophers, who they calculate to make up about 1.3 % of U.S. philoso-
phers, tend to work disproportionally in certain subfields. If minority types do, in fact,
learn to avoid collaborating with majority types, this may lead minority types to seek
out areas where they are more likely to encounter others like themselves. Alternatively,
in subdisciplines where minority types have higher numbers, they may be less likely to
be disadvantaged in strategic interactions. If so, this may attract other minority types
to such subdisciplines.
4.2.4 Minority Disadvantage and Existing Bias
The work we have presented to this point all involves simulations where we do not make
assumptions about the starting proportions of strategies in a population. In other words,
our simulations randomize over the starting points epistemic communities might take—
half of actors make fair demands, or 1/3, or 90% of actors make High demands, etc.—and
then look at what proportions of outcomes arise from this random collection.20
For the phenomena we are studying, however, there is little reason to think that the
starting points of epistemic communities are random. Epistemic communities are often
embedded in societies where discriminatory behavior against women and racial minorities
already exists. For this reason, one might be especially interested in what happens in
these simulations when one starts with a relatively high proportion of majority types
who behave in a discriminatory way towards minority types.
In these restricted cases, our results are significantly strengthened. Why would this
be the case? When a significant proportion of a majority population is already demand-
ing High or playing Solo against a minority population, the best thing the minority
population can do is to respond by demanding Low or playing Solo themselves. If the
minority population does this more slowly, the majority population has time to learn
other behaviors, meaning that the group may arrive at a non-discriminatory norm. If the
minority population does this quickly, and the majority population keeps discriminating
because they learn slowly, the group will end up at the discriminatory norm.
We mentioned that there are games where the minority effect leads to minority ad-
vantage because generally it benefits the minority to quickly learn to play a strategy that
benefits them. Even for these games, though, if one looks only at starting populations
where there is a significant amount of discrimination in the other population, learning
speed instead hurts the minority group.
20In doing so, we are measuring what are called the ‘basins of attraction’ for populations playing games
under the dynamics we use. These basins specify which proportions of population states evolve to which
equilibria.
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4.3 Summary
To summarize the new results presented: minority groups in academia can end up dis-
advantaged in collaborative scenarios as a result of differential learning speed. This
disadvantage is more likely to arise for small groups. This disadvantage is also more
likely to arise in situations where actors do not have the option to work alone. When it
does arise, it is more harmful to small groups than large ones. And furthermore, it can
deter minority types from collaborating with majority types, possibly leading minorities
to cluster in academic subdisciplines. Lastly, if a majority group is already discrimi-
nating to some degree, the fact that minority groups quickly learn to deal with them is
more detrimental to the minority type.
Significantly, the effects we describe can arise without what one would think of as
particularly pernicious behavior on the part of either group. In particular, actors need
not be implicitly biased against minority types for these effects to arise. The precondi-
tions for these effects are that 1) actors condition behavior on their type of interactive
partner, 2) actors learn to behave in ways that benefit themselves, and 3) one type is
in the minority. The only one of these conditions that might be thought of as ethically
questionable is conditioning behavior on one’s type of interacting partner. While this is
arguably problematic, it does not have the same ethical character as, say, purposefully
tanking a black colleague’s tenure case, or harassing female graduate students. Note that
this does not mean that the resulting behavior in these models represents something eth-
ically unproblematic—it does. The point is that from relatively neutral starting points,
actors can slowly learn to behave in ways consistent with discrimination and bias, and
that this is more likely to negatively affect minority groups.
5 Epistemic Minorities and Epistemic Implications
Philosophers of science and feminist epistemologists have argued convincingly that in-
quiry is inherently value laden (Longino, 1990, 2002; Potter, 1993; Harding, 1991, 1998;
Wylie, 2007). Theories are underdetermined by evidence and so background assumptions
and values will play a role in determining theory choice (Longino, 1990, 2002; Nelson,
1993). This means that two different researchers will potentially generate knowledge dif-
ferently, and thus the make-up of an epistemic community may influence what theories
that community generates and supports.
Many have argued that, in particular, epistemically diverse communities are more
successful than uniform ones. Longino (1990, 2002) contends that research communi-
ties that hold uniform assumptions and prejudices will lack the critical perspective to
challenge these viewpoints. Zollman (2010) uses models to argue that epistemic com-
munities that hold a variety of beliefs may be more likely to eventually converge on
successful theories. Kuhn (2013) argues that disagreement among scientists is a crucial
part of theory change and that this will only occur in groups with some diversity of
choice criteria for theories. Kitcher (1990) holds that it is beneficial for a community of
agents to work on diverse problems and to use diverse methodologies for similar reasons.
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Thoma (2015) uses models to conclude that populations where agents employ mixtures
of problem choice strategies are, in some cases, more successful than uniform groups.21
To summarize these arguments, epistemic diversity may be beneficial with respect to (at
least) assumptions and prejudices, theoretic beliefs, criteria for adopting new theories,
scientific methods, and problem choice.
It has further been argued that gender and racial diversity, in many cases, correlate
with epistemic diversity because social identity influences the research problems, as-
sumptions, and prejudices of individuals.22 For example, Haraway (1989) outlines how
the introduction of female scientists revolutionized the field of primatology, which had
previously focused largely on the behavior of male primates. Female primatologists also
introduced pioneering methodologies designed to prevent sexist assumptions from creep-
ing into primate research. Longino (1990) describes the debate over ‘man-the-hunter’
and ‘woman-the-gatherer’ theories of the evolution of human cognition. In this case
gender played a role in leading scientists to challenge a problematic dominant paradigm
(albeit with their own value-laden theory).23
This connection between personal diversity and epistemic diversity implies that cul-
tural Red King effects may impact the progress of epistemic communities where minority
groups leave the field, or do not collaborate with majority types. A further question
is whether this effect extends to epistemic minorities—groups of agents in epistemic
communities who hold uncommon views, use uncommon methods, etc. Are epistemic
minorities likely to end up disadvantaged by the effects we have outlined?
The question is whether or not researchers condition their bargaining and collabo-
rative behavior on the epistemic type of their interactive partner. We certainly think
this is plausible in the case of collaboration. If so, our results suggest that epistemic
majorities may learn to collaborate amongst themselves, but not with epistemic minori-
ties, and that this should be more likely the smaller the minority population. To some
degree, it is normal for researchers working on the same problems to work together.
(And it is hard to imagine that this is not a good thing for epistemic progress.) On the
other hand, if such outcomes occur for epistemic minorities who use different methods
or starting assumptions, this may be problematic. If epistemic agents avoid those unlike
themselves, the sort of critical debate championed by Longino (1990) may be hampered
and the synergistic effects that occur when researchers use diverse methodologies argued
for by Kitcher (1990) and Thoma (2015) might be lost.
6 Conclusion
It may not always be possible to empirically examine processes that involve complex
moving parts (such as many actors in a research community) and that are extended in
21Weisberg and Muldoon (2009) introduced an earlier model with similar results, but see Thoma
(2015) and Alexander et al. (2015).
22For more on this, see work in standpoint epistemology such as Harding (1991, 1998).
23It is harder to find clear cases where personal diversity is important in areas like physics or mathe-
matics, though some have argued for such effects (Harding, 1991, 1998; Fehr, 2011).
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time (such as social change). In cases like this, mathematical models allow exploration
of causal possibilities that empirical and philosophical methods do not. In a model, one
can alter conditions in a controlled way and see how these alterations influence outcomes
(Weisberg, 2013). That said, models are, by necessity, simplifications of the real world,
and one must take care when using them to inform complex processes. In this case it
is appropriate to ask: Are the models here explanatory? What epistemic roles can they
play?
There are at least two reasons to think that the results described here at least have
the potential to occur in real communities. First, the general results described are robust.
When actors condition on types, the dynamics of an evolving population are completely
altered. These type-conditional effects occur across games and dynamics. The minority
effects outlined are likewise robust. They occur because of a disparity in the learning
situations that minority and majority groups find themselves in, and, again, happen
across games and dynamics (Bruner, 2017; O’Connor, 2017a,b; Rubin and O’Connor,
2017). Robust results are arguably more likely to be genuinely explanatory of real world
phenomena since the real world situations being modeled are more likely to fall under
the set of conditions where these results arise.
Second, the aspects of the models here that lead to disadvantage are features of the
real world. As discussed, minority disadvantage occurs in these models whenever actors
1) learn to behave in their own best interest, 2) condition on types, and 3) one type
is in the minority. Experimental work on humans indicates that they (unsurprisingly)
learn to do what benefits them in games. The second condition, as discussed, has been
widely verified across academic settings. And obviously in many academic communities
minority groups exist.
This points to an epistemic role for these models as telling ‘how-potentially’ stories
(Rosenstock et al., 2017). They can direct our attention to an effect that has the po-
tential to really occur, and prompt further investigation, both theoretical and empirical,
into this effect. There is an another epistemic role for these models as well, which is
to outline the surprisingly sparse preconditions necessary to produce minority disadvan-
tage. Our models do not capture behaviors that are widely thought to disadvantage
underrepresented groups in epistemic communities, including stereotype threat and im-
plicit bias. But even if these factors are eradicated in epistemic communities, if the
above preconditions hold, disadvantage can arise for these minorities groups. This is a
version of ‘how-possibly’ modeling—it specifies under what conditions a surprising effect
can possibly arise.
Before finishing, we would like to briefly discuss ways for mitigating or preventing
detrimental minority effects in epistemic communities. The real driver of the results
we see is type-conditional behavior. Without it, discriminatory conventions like those
discussed are not possible. It may not be particularly novel to argue that researchers
should treat each other equally. This said, our results give further support to the intuitive
argument that type-conditional treatment (even if one attempts to make it separate but
equal) can be damaging.
What can be done to decrease type-conditional behavior? Although our models, as
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discussed, do not explicitly represent bias, the literature on implicit bias explores how
to reduce type-conditional behavior in a way that may be helpful here. One option is to
shape institutional settings to prevent type conditioning from occurring at all. Actors
can be motivated to prevent prejudiced behavior by their peers groups and by leadership
at universities (Hopkins, 2006; Lee, 2016). Ensuring that actors have enough time and
attention to carefully make potentially biased judgements also decreases the effects of
bias (Hofmann et al., 2005). A second option is for institutions to adopt specific policies
that stop the effects of type-conditional behavior, such as blinding in journal reviewing
and merit reviews.24
In this paper, we argue that the minority effects may have implications for epistemic
progress. We do this by modeling the emergence of conventions of bargaining and collab-
oration in these communities. While philosophers have extensively modeled aspects of
epistemic communities related to theory choice and research patterns, there has been rel-
atively little modeling of the impact of conventional and normative patterns of behavior
on epistemic progress. There are many promising extensions for this work, for example,
into the emergence of collaboration in groups with intersectional social identities and
into the effects of such conventions on the formation on collaboration networks.
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